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Abstract
We consider a sequence of transferable utility (TU) games where, at each time,
the characteristic function is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set
of values. The game differs from other ones in the literature on dynamic, stochastic
or interval valued TU games as it combines dynamics of the game with an allocation
protocol for the players that dynamically interact with each other. The protocol is
an iterative and decentralized algorithm that offers a paradigmatic mathematical
description of negotiation and bargaining processes. The first part of the paper
contributes to the definition of a robust (coalitional) TU game and the development
of a distributed bargaining protocol. We prove the convergence with probability
1 of the bargaining process to a random allocation that lies in the core of the ro-
bust game under some mild conditions on the underlying communication graphs.
The second part of the paper addresses the more general case where the robust
game may have empty core. In this case, with the dynamic game we associate a
dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence of characteristic func-
tions. Then, we consider an accordingly modified bargaining protocol. Assuming
that the sequence of characteristic functions is ergodic and the core of the average
game has a nonempty relative interior, we show that the modified bargaining pro-
tocol converges with probability 1 to a random allocation that lies in the core of the
average game.
1 Introduction
Coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) have been introduced by von Neumann
and Morgenstern [27]. A coalitional TU game constitutes of a set of players, who can
form coalitions, and a characteristic function that provides a value for each coalition. The
value of a coalition can be thought of as a monetary value that can be divided among the
members of the coalition according to some appropriate fairness allocation rule.
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Coalitional TU games have been used to model cooperation in supply chain or inven-
tory management applications [6, 10], as well as in network flow applications to coordinate
flows of goods, materials, or resources between different production/distribution sites [2].
Recently, coalitional games have also sparked much interest in communication networks.
We refer an interested reader to tutorial [23] for an in-depth discussion on potential ap-
plications in this field.
In this paper, we consider a sequence of coalitional TU games for a finite set of players.
We assume that the game is played repeatedly over time thus generating a sequence of
time varying characteristic functions. We refer to such a repeated game as dynamic
coalitional TU game. In addition, we assume that a player need not necessarily observe
the allocations of all the other players, but he can only observe the allocations of his
neighbors, where the neighbors may change in time.
In this setting, we consider robust and average TU games, and for each of these games
we propose an allocation process to reach a solution of the dynamic game. More specifi-
cally, we formulate a dynamic bargaining process as a dynamically changing constrained
problem. Iterations are simply bargaining steps free of any concrete reward allocation.
We assume that the reward allocation occurs only once at the end of the bargaining pro-
cess, when the players have agreed on how to allocate rewards among themselves. Our
main objective is to explore distributed agreement on solutions in the core of the game,
where the players interact only with their neighbors.
In particular, we consider bargaining protocols assuming that each player i obeys
rationality and efficiency by deciding on an allocation vector which satisfies the value
constraints of all the coalitions that include player i. This set is termed bounding set of
player i. At every iteration, a player i observes the allocations of some of his neighbors.
This is modeled using a directed graph with the set of players as the vertex set and a
time-varying edge set composed of directed links (i, j) whenever player i observes the al-
location vector proposed by player j at time t. We refer to this directed graph as players’
neighbor-graph. Given a player’s neighbor-graph, each player i negotiates allocations by
adjusting the allocations he received from his neighbors through weight assignments. As
the balanced allocation may violate his rationality constraints (it lies outside player i’s
bounding set), the player selects a new allocation by projecting the balanced allocation
on his bounding set. We propose such bargaining protocols for solving both the robust
and the average TU game. For each of these games, we use some mild assumptions on
the connectivity of the players’ neighbor-graph and the weights that the players use when
balancing their own allocations with the neighbors’ allocations. Assuming that the core
of the robust game is nonempty, we show that our bargaining protocol converges with
probability 1 to a common (random) allocation in the core. In the case when the core of
the robust game is empty, we consider an average game that can provide a meaningful so-
lution under some conditions on the sequence of the characteristic functions. Specifically,
in this case, we consider a dynamic average game by averaging over time the sequence
of characteristic functions. We then modify accordingly the bounding set and the associ-
ated bargaining process by using the dynamic average game. This means that the value
constraints are defined by using the time-averaged sequence rather than the sequence of
random characteristic functions. Under the assumptions that the time-averaged sequence
is ergodic and that the core of the average game has a nonempty relative interior, we
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show that the players’ allocations generated by our bargaining protocol converge with
probability 1 to a common (random) allocation in the core of the average game.
The main contributions of this paper are in the two-fold dynamic aspect of the games,
and in the development and the analysis of distributed bargaining process among the
players. The novelty in the dynamic aspect is in the consideration of games with time-
varying characteristic functions and the use of time-varying local players interactions.
The work in this paper is related to stochastic cooperative games [9, 24, 25]. How-
ever, we deviate from this stochastic framework in a number of aspects among which are
the existence of a local players interactions captured by players’ neighbor-graph and the
presence of multiple iterations in the bargaining process, and the consideration of robust
game. Bringing dynamical aspects into the framework of coalitional TU games is an ele-
ment in common with papers [8, 11]. However, unlike [8, 11], the values of the coalitions
in this paper are realized exogenously and no relation is assumed between consecutive
samples. Dynamic robust TU games have been considered in [3] and [4] but for a con-
tinuous time setting in the former work and for a centralized allocation process in the
latter one. Convergence of allocation processes is a main topic in [5, 13]. There, rewards
are allocated by a game designer repeatedly in a centralized manner and based on the
current excess rewards of the coalitions (accumulated reward up to current time minus
the value of the coalition). Our approach, however, differs from that of [5, 13] as we resort
to a decentralized scheme where the allocation process is the result of a bargaining pro-
cess among the players with local interactions. Convergence of bargaining processes has
also been explored under dynamic coalition formation [1] for a different dynamic model,
where players decide both on which coalition to address and what payoff to announce.
Coalitions form when announced payoffs are all met for all players in the coalition. Our
bargaining procedure is different as it produces an agreement resulting in the formation
of grand coalition, which is stable with respect to any sub-coalitions.
The work in this paper is also related to the literature on agreement among multiple
agents, where an underlying communication graph for the agents and balancing weights
have been used with some variations [26, 15] to reach an agreement on common decision
variable, as well as in [16, 17, 20, 19] for distributed multi-agent optimization.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the dynamic TU game,
the robust game and the bargaining protocol for this game. We then motivate the game
and give some preliminary results. In Section 3, we prove the convergence of the bargaining
protocol to a point in the core of the robust game with probability 1. In Section 4, we
introduce the dynamic average game and the modified bargaining protocol. We also
prove the convergence of this protocol to an allocation in the core of the average game
with probability 1. In Section 5, we report some numerical simulations to illustrate our
theoretical study, and we conclude in Section 6.
Notation. We view vectors as columns. For a vector x, we use xi or [x]i to denote its
ith coordinate component. For two vectors x and y, we use x < y (x ≤ y) to denote
xi < yi (xi ≤ yi) for all coordinate indices i. We let x′ denote the transpose of a vector
x, and ‖x‖ denote its Euclidean norm. An n× n matrix A is row-stochastic if the matrix
has nonnegative entries aij and
∑n
j=1 aij = 1 for all i = 1, . . . , n. For a matrix A, we use
aij or [A]ij to denote its ijth entry. A matrix A is doubly stochastic if both A and its
transpose A′ are row-stochastic. Given two sets U and S, we write U ⊂ S to denote that
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U is a proper subset of S. We use |S| for the cardinality of a given finite set S.
We write PX [x] to denote the projection of a vector x on a set X, and we write
dist(x,X) for the distance from x to X, i.e., PX [x] = arg miny∈X ‖x−y‖ and dist(x,X) =
‖x − PX [x]‖, respectively. Given a set X and a scalar λ ∈ R, the set λX is defined by
λX , {λx | x ∈ X}. Given two sets X, Y ⊆ Rn, the set sum X + Y is defined by
X + Y , {x + y | x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }. Given a set N of players and a function η : S 7→ R
defined for each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , we write < N, η > to denote the transferable
utility (TU) game with the players’ set N and the characteristic function η. We let ηS
be the value η(S) of the characteristic function η associated with a nonempty coalition
S ⊆ N . Given a TU game < N, η >, we use C(η) to denote the core of the game,
C(η) =
{
x ∈ R|N |
∣∣∣ ∑i∈N xi = ηN , ∑i∈S xi ≥ ηS for all nonempty S ⊂ N} .
2 Dynamic TU Game and Robust Game
In this section, we discuss the main components of a dynamic TU game and a robust
game. We state some basic assumptions on these games and introduce a bargaining
process conducted by the players to reach an agreement on their allocations. We also
provide some examples of the TU games motivating our development and establish some
basic results that we use later on in the convergence analysis of the bargaining process.
2.1 Problem Formulation and Bargaining Process
Consider a set of players N = {1, . . . , n} and the set of all (nonempty) coalitions S ⊆ N
arising among these players. Let m = 2n − 1 be the number of possible coalitions. We
assume that the time is discrete and use t = 0, 1, 2, . . . to index the time slots.
We consider a dynamic TU game, denoted < N, {v(t)} >, where {v(t)} is a sequence
of characteristic functions. Thus, in the dynamic TU game < N, {v(t)} >, the players are
involved in a sequence of instantaneous TU games whereby, at each time t, the instanta-
neous TU game is < N, v(t) > with v(t) ∈ Rm for all t ≥ 0. Further, we let vS(t) denote
the value assigned to a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N in the instantaneous game < N, v(t) >.
In what follows, we deal with dynamic TU games where each characteristic function v(t)
is a random vector with realizations restricted to some set of values. We will consider the
robust TU game in this section and Section 3, while in Section 4 we deal with the average
TU game.
In our development of robust TU game, we impose restrictions on each realization
of v(t) for every t ≥ 0. Specifically, we assume that the grand coalition value vN(t) is
deterministic for every t ≥ 0, while the values vS(t) of the other coalitions S ⊂ N have a
common upper bound. These conditions are formally stated in the following assumption.
Assumption 1 There exists vmax ∈ Rm such that for all t ≥ 0,
vN(t) = v
max
N ,
vS(t) ≤ vmaxS for all nonempty coalitions S ⊂ N.
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We refer to the game < N, vmax > as robust game. In the first part of this paper, we
rely on the assumption that the robust game has a nonempty core.
Assumption 2 The core C(vmax) of the robust game is not empty.
An immediate consequence of Assumptions 1 and 2 is that the core C(v(t)) of the
instantaneous game is always not empty. This follows from the fact that C(vmax) ⊆ C(η)
for any η satisfying ηN = v
max
N and ηS ≤ vmaxS for S ⊂ N , and the assumption that the
core C(vmax) is not empty.
Throughout the paper, we assume that each player i is rational and efficient. This
translates to each player i ∈ N choosing his allocation vector within the set of allocations
satisfying value constraints of all the coalitions that include player i. This set is referred
to as the bounding set of player i and, for a generic game < N, η >, it is given by
Xi(η) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
j∈N
xj = ηN ,
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ ηS for all S ⊂ N s.t. i ∈ S
}
.
Note that each Xi(η) is polyhedral.
In what follows, we find it suitable to represent the bounding sets and the core in
alternative equivalent forms. For each nonempty coalition S ⊆ N , let eS ∈ Rn be the
incidence vector for the coalition S, i.e., the vector with the coordinates given by
[eS]i =
{
1 if i ∈ S,
0 else.
Then, the bounding sets and the core can be represented as follows:
Xi(η) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN , e′Sx ≥ ηS for all S ⊂ N with i ∈ S}, (1)
C(η) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN , e′Sx ≥ ηS for all nonempty S ⊂ N}. (2)
Furthermore, observe that the core C(η) of the game coincides with the intersection of
the bounding sets Xi(η) of all players i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, i.e.,
C(η) = ∩ni=1Xi(η). (3)
We now discuss the bargaining protocol where repeatedly over time each player i ∈
N submits an allocation vector that the player would agree on. The allocation vector
proposed by player i at time t is denoted by xi(t) ∈ Rn, where the jth component xij(t)
represents the amount that player i would assign to player j. To simplify the notation in
the dynamic game < N, {v(t)} >, we let Xi(t) denote the bounding set of player i for the
instantaneous game < N, v(t) >, i.e., for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
Xi(t) =
{
x ∈ Rn |
∑
j∈N
xj = vN(t),
∑
j∈S
xj ≥ vS(t) for all S ⊂ N s.t. i ∈ S
}
. (4)
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Figure 1: Players’ neighbor graphs for 6 players and two different time instances.
We assume that each player may observe the allocations of a subset of the other
players at any time, which are termed as the neighbors of the player. The players and
their neighbors at time t can be represented by a directed graph G(t) = (N, E(t)), with
the vertex set N and the set E(t) of directed links. A link (i, j) ∈ E(t) exists if player j
is a neighbor of player i at time t. We always assume that (i, i) ∈ E(t) for all t, which is
natural since every player i can always access its own allocation vector. We refer to graph
G(t) as a neighbor-graph at time t. In the graph G(t), a player j is a neighbor of player i
(i.e., (i, j) ∈ E(t)) only if player i can observe the allocation vector of player j at time t.
Figure 1 illustrates how the players’ neighbor-graph may look at two time instances.
Given the players’ neighbor-graph G(t), each player i negotiates allocations by aver-
aging his allocation and the allocations he received from his neighbors. More precisely,
at time t, the bargaining process for each player i involves the player’s individual bound-
ing set Xi(t), its own allocation x
i(t) and the observed allocations xj(t) of some of his
neighbors j. Formally, we let Ni(t) be the set of neighbors of player i at time t (including
himself), i.e.,
Ni(t) = {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ E(t)}.
With this notation, the bargaining process is given by:
xi(t+ 1) = PXi(t)
 ∑
j∈Ni(t)
aij(t)x
j(t)
 for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0, (5)
where aij(t) ≥ 0 is a scalar weight that player i assigns to the proposed allocation xj(t)
of player j and PXi(t)[·] is the projection onto the player i bounding set Xi(t). The initial
allocations xi(0), i = 1, . . . , n, are selected randomly and independently of {v(t)}.
The bargaining process in (5) can be written more compactly by introducing zero
weights for players j whose allocations are not available to player i at time t. Specifically
by defining aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t) and all t ≥ 0, we have the following equivalent
representation of the bargaining process:
xi(t+ 1) = PXi(t)
[
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)
]
for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. (6)
Here, aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t) while aij(t) ≥ 0 for j ∈ Ni(t).
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We now discuss the specific assumptions on the weights aij(t) and the players’ neighbor-
graph that we will rely on. We let A(t) be the weight matrix with entries aij(t). We will
use the following assumption for the weight matrices.
Assumption 3 Each matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic with positive diagonal. Further-
more, there exists a scalar α > 0 such that
aij(t) ≥ α whenever aij(t) > 0.
In view of the construction of matrices A(t), we see that aij(t) ≥ α for j = i and perhaps
for some players j that are neighbors of player i. The requirement that the positive weights
are uniformly bounded away from zero is imposed to ensure that the information from
each player diffuses to his neighbors in the network persistently in time. The requirement
on the doubly stochasticity of the weights is used to ensure that in a long run each player
has equal influence on the limiting allocation vector.
It is natural to expect that the connectivity of the players’ neighbor-graphs G(t) =
(N, E(t)) impacts the bargaining process. At any time, the instantaneous graph G(t) need
not be connected. However, for the proper behavior of the bargaining process, the union
of the graphs G(t) over a period of time is assumed to be connected, as given in the
following assumption.
Assumption 4 There is an integer Q ≥ 1 such that the graph
(
N,
⋃(t+1)Q−1
τ=tQ E(τ)
)
is
strongly connected for every t ≥ 0.
Assumptions 3 and 4 together guarantee that the players communicate sufficiently of-
ten to ensure that the information of each player is persistently diffused over the network
in time to reach every other player. Under these assumptions, we will study the dynamic
bargaining process in (6). We want to provide conditions under which the process con-
verges to an allocation in the core of the robust game. Before this, we provide some
motivating examples in the following section.
2.2 Motivations
Dynamic coalitional games capture coordination in a number of network flow applications.
Network flows model flow of goods, materials, or other resources between different produc-
tion/distribution sites [2]. We next provide two examples. The first one is more practically
oriented and describes a supply chain application [6]. The second one is more theoretical
and re-casts the problem at hand in terms of controlled flows over hyper-graphs.
2.2.1 Supply chain
A single warehouse v0 serves a number of retailers vi, i = 1, . . . , n, each one facing a
demand di(t) unknown but bounded by pre assigned values d
min
i ∈ R and dmaxi ∈ R at any
time period t ≥ 0. After demand di(t) has been realized, retailer vi must choose to either
fulfill the demand or not. The retailers do not hold any private inventory and, therefore,
if they wish to fulfill their demands, they must reorder goods from the central warehouse.
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Retailers benefit from joint reorders as they may share the total transportation cost K
(this cost could also be time and/or players dependent). In particular, if retailer vi “plays”
individually, the cost of reordering coincides with the full transportation cost K. Actually,
when necessary a single truck will serve only him and get back to the warehouse. This is
illustrated by the dashed path (v0,v1,v0) in the network of Figure 2(a). The cost of not
reordering is the cost of the unfulfilled demand di(t).
v1
v2
v3
v0
(a) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1 and returning to v0.
v1
v2
v3
v0
(b) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1 and v2, and then re-
turning to v0.
v1
v2
v3
v0
(c) Truck leaving v0, serv-
ing v1, v2, and v3, and
then returning to v0.
Figure 2: Example of one warehouse v0 and three retailers v1, v2 and v3.
If two or more retailers “play” in a coalition, they agree on a joint decision (“everyone
reorders” or “no one reorders”). The cost of reordering for the coalition also equals
the total transportation cost that must be shared among the retailers. In this case,
when necessary a single truck will serve all retailers in the coalition and get back to the
warehouse. This is illustrated, with reference to coalition {v1,v2} by the dashed path
(v0,v1,v2,v0) in Figure 2(b). A similar comment applies to the coalition {v1,v2,v3} and
the path (v0,v1,v2,v3,v0) in Figure 2(c). The cost of not reordering is the sum of the
unfulfilled demands of all retailers. How the players will share the cost is a part of the
solution generated by the bargaining process.
The cost scheme can be captured by a game with the set N = {v1, . . . ,vn} of players
where the cost of a nonempty coalition S ⊆ N is given by
cS(t) = min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
di(t)
}
.
Note that the bounds on the demand di(t) reflect into the bounds on the cost as follows:
for all nonempty S ⊆ N and t ≥ 0,
min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmini
}
≤ cS(t) ≤ min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmaxi
}
. (7)
To complete the derivation of the coalitions’ values we need to compute the cost savings
vS(t) of a coalition S as the difference between the sum of the costs of the coalitions of
the individual players in S and the cost of the coalition itself, namely,
vS(t) =
∑
i∈S
c{i}(t)− cS(t).
8
v1 v2 v3 v4 v5 v6 v7
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3}
Table 1: Vertex-coalition correspondence for a 3-player coalitional game.
Given the bound for cS(t) in (7), the value vS(t) is also bounded, as given: for any
S ⊂ N and t ≥ 0,
vS(t) ≤
∑
i∈S
min {K, dmaxi } −min
{
K,
∑
i∈S
dmini
}
.
Thus, the cost savings (value) of each coalition is bounded uniformly by a maximum value.
2.2.2 Network controlled flows
Here, we provide a more theoretical example where the bargaining process provides a
way for the nodes of a hyper-graph to agree on the edge controlled flows [2]. Consider
the hyper-graph H = {V,E} with the vertex set V = {v1, . . . ,vm} and the edge-set
E = {e1, . . . , en}. The vertex set V has one vertex per each coalition, while the edge-set
E has one edge per each player. An edge ei is incident to a vertex vj if the player i is
in the coalition associated with vj. For a 3-player coalitional game, the vertex-coalition
correspondence is shown in Table 1. The corresponding hyper-graph is shown in Figure 3.
v1
v2
v3
v4
v5
v6
v7
e1
e3
e2
Figure 3: Hyper-graph H = {V,E} for a 3-player coalitional game.
The incidence relations are described by a matrix BH = [e′S]S⊆N ∈ Rm×n whose rows
are the characteristic vectors of all coalitions S ⊆ N . The flow control reformulation
arises naturally by viewing an allocation value a˜i(t) of player i as the flow on the edge ei
associated with player i. The demand dj(t) at a vertex vj is the value vS(t) of the coalition
S associated with the vertex vj. In view of this, an allocation in the core translates into
satisfying in excess the demand at the vertices, or formally:
a˜(t) ∈ C(v(t)) ⇔ BHa˜(t) ≥ d(t).
In this case, the efficiency condition
∑
i∈N a˜i(t) = vN(t) corresponds to the equality
constraint
∑
i∈N a˜i(t) = dm(t). When dm(t) is a constant, say dm(t) = f for an f > 0, the
resulting constraint
∑
i∈N a˜i(t) = f can be interpreted as a total flow constraint, stating
that the total flow in the network has to be equal to the given value f .
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In this framework, the bargaining process is an algorithmic and distributed mecha-
nism that ensures the players reach an agreement on controlled flows satisfying uncertain
demand at the nodes.
2.3 Preliminary Results
In this section we derive some preliminary results pertinent to the core of the robust game
and some error bounds for polyhedral sets applicable to the players’ bounding sets Xi(t).
We later use these results to establish the convergence of the bargaining process in (6).
In our analysis we often use the following relation that is valid for the projection
operation on a closed convex set X ⊆ Rn: for any w ∈ Rn and any x ∈ X,
‖PX [w]− x‖2 ≤ ‖w − x‖2 − ‖PX [w]− w‖2, (8)
This property of the projection operation is known as a strictly non-expansive projection
property (see [7], volume II, 12.1.13 Lemma on page 1120).
We next prove a result that relates the distance dist(x,C(η)) between a point x and
the core C(η) with the distances dist(x,Xi(η)) between x and the bounding sets Xi(η).
This result will be crucial in our later development. The result relies on the polyhedrality
of the bounding sets Xi(η) and the core C(η), as given in (1) and (2) respectively, and
a special relation for polyhedral sets. This special relation states that for a nonempty
polyhedral set P = {x ∈ Rn | a′`x ≤ b`, ` = 1, . . . , r}, there exists a scalar c > 0 such that
dist(x,P) ≤ c
r∑
`=1
dist(x,H`) for all x ∈ Rn, (9)
where H` = {x ∈ Rn | a′`x ≤ b`} and the scalar c depends on the vectors a`, ` = 1, . . . , r
only. Relation (9) has been established by Hoffman [12] and is known as Hoffman bound.
Aside from the Hoffman bound, in establishing the forthcoming Lemma 1, we also use
the fact that the square distance from a point x to a closed convex set X contained in an
affine set H is given by
dist2(x,X) = ‖x− PH [x]‖2 + dist2(PH [x], X), (10)
which is illustrated in Figure 4.
Now, we are ready to present the result relating the values dist2(x,C(η)) and dist2(x,Xi(η)).
Lemma 1 Let < N, η > be a TU game with a nonempty core C(η). Then, there is a
constant µ > 0 such that
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(η)) for all x ∈ Rn,
where µ depends on the collection of vectors {e˜S | S ⊂ N, S 6= ∅}, where each e˜S is the
projection of eS on the hyperplane H = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = ηN}.
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Figure 4: Projection on a set X contained in an affine set H.
Proof. Since the hyperplane H contains the core C(η) (see (2)), by relation (10) we have
dist2(x,C(η)) = ‖x− PH [x]‖2 + dist2(PH [x], C(η)) for all x ∈ Rn. (11)
The point PH [x] and the core C(η) lie in the n− 1-dimensional affine set H. By applying
the Hoffman bound relative to the affine set H (cf. Eq. (9)), we obtain
dist(PH [x], C(η)) ≤ c
∑
S⊂N
dist(PH [x], H ∩HS),
where the summation is over nonempty subsets S, HS = {x ∈ Rn | e′Sx ≥ ηS}, while
the constant c depends on the collection {e˜S, S ⊂ N} of projections of vectors eS on the
hyperplane H for S ⊂ N . Thus, it follows
dist2(PH [x], C(η)) ≤ c2
(∑
S⊂N
dist(PH [x], H ∩HS)
)2
≤ c2(m− 1)
∑
S⊂N
dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS), (12)
where m is the number of nonempty subsets of N and the last inequality follows by
(
∑`
j=1 aj)
2 ≤ `∑`j=1 a2j , which is valid for any finite collection of scalars aj, j = 1, . . . , `
with ` ≥ 1. Combining Eq. (12) with equality (11), we obtain for any x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ ‖x− PH [x]‖2 + c2(m− 1)
∑
S⊂N
dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)
≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
(‖x− PH [x]‖2 + dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS)) ,
where c1 = max{1, c2(m− 1)}. Since the set H is affine, in view of relation (10) we have
‖x− PH [x]‖2 + dist2(PH [x], H ∩HS) = dist2(x,H ∩HS), implying that for any x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
dist2(x,H ∩HS).
From the preceding relation, it follows for any x ∈ Rn,
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
∑
S⊂N
|S| dist2(x,H ∩HS), (13)
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where |S| denotes the cardinality of the coalition S. Note that∑
S⊂N
|S| dist2(x,H ∩HS) =
∑
S⊂N
∑
i∈S
dist2(x,H ∩HS)
=
n∑
i=1
 ∑
{S⊂N |i∈S}
dist2(x,H ∩HS)
 . (14)
We also note that Xi(η) ⊂ H ∩ HS for each nonempty S ⊂ N and i ∈ S, which follows
by the definition of HS and relation (1). Furthermore, since dist(x, Y ) ≤ dist(x,X) for
any x ∈ Rn and for any two closed convex sets X, Y ⊆ Rn such that X ⊂ Y , it follows
that for all x ∈ Rn,
dist(x,H ∩HS) ≤ dist(x,Xi(η)). (15)
By combining relations (13)–(15), we obtain
dist2(x,C(η)) ≤ c1
n∑
i=1
 ∑
{S⊂N |i∈S}
dist2(x,Xi(η))

= c1κ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(η)),
where κ is the number of coalitions S that contain player i, which is the same number for
every player (κ does not depend on i). The desired relation follows by letting µ = c1κ,
and by recalling that c1 = max{1, c2(m− 1)} and that c depends on the projections e˜S of
vectors eS, S ⊂ N , on the hyperplane H.
Note that the scalar µ in Lemma 1 does not depend on the coalitions’ values ηS for
S 6= N . It depends only on the vectors eS, S ⊆ N , and the grand coalition value ηN .
As a direct consequence of Lemma 1, we have the following result for the instantaneous
game < N, v(t) > under the assumptions of Section 2.1.
Lemma 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. We then have for all t ≥ 0,
dist2(x,C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2(x,Xi(t)) for all x ∈ Rn,
where C(v(t)) is the core of the game < N, v(t) >, Xi(t) is the bounding set of player i,
and µ is the constant from Lemma 1.
Proof. By Assumption 2, we have that the core C(vmax) is nonempty. Furthermore,
under Assumption 1, we have C(vmax) ⊆ C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0, implying that the core
C(v(t)) is nonempty for all t ≥ 0.
Under Assumption 1, each core C(v(t)) is defined by the same affine equality corre-
sponding to the grand coalition value, e′Nx = v
max
N . Moreover, each core C(v(t)) is defined
through the set of hyperplanes HS(t) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Sx ≥ vS(t)}, S ⊂ N , which have time
invariant normal vectors eS, S ⊆ N . Thus, the result follows from Lemma 1.
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3 Convergence to Core of Robust Game
In this section, we prove convergence of the bargaining process in (6) to a random allo-
cation that lies in the core of the robust game with probability 1. We find it convenient
to re-write the bargaining protocol (6) by isolating a linear and a non-linear term. The
linear term is the vector wi(t) defined as:
wi(t) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. (16)
Note that wi(t) is linear in players’ allocations xj(t). The non-linear term is the error
ei(t) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)]− wi(t). (17)
Now, using (16) and (17), we can rewrite protocol (6) as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = wi(t) + ei(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. (18)
Recall that the weights aij(t) are nonnegative and such that aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t).
Also, recall that A(t) is the matrix with entries aij(t), which governs the construction of
the vectors wi(t) in (16).
The main result of this section shows that, with probability 1, the bargaining proto-
col (16)–(18) converges to the core C(vmax) of the robust game < N, vmax >, provided
that v(t) = vmax happens infinitely often in time with probability 1. To establish this we
use some auxiliary results, which we develop in the next two lemmas.
The following lemma provides a result on the sequences xi(t) and shows that the errors
ei(t) are diminishing.
Lemma 3 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Also, assume that each matrix A(t) is doubly
stochastic. Then, for the bargaining protocol (16)–(18), we have
(a) The sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2} converges for every x ∈ C(vmax).
(b) The errors ei(t) in (17) are such that
∑∞
t=0
∑n
j=1 ‖ei(t)‖2 < ∞. In particular,
limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N .
Proof. By xi(t+1) = PXi(t)[w
i(t)] and by strictly non-expansive property of the Euclidean
projection on a closed convex set Xi(t) (see (8)), we have for any i ∈ N , t ≥ 0 and
x ∈ Xi(t),
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤ ‖wi(t)− x‖2 − ‖ei(t)‖2. (19)
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, the core C(vmax) is contained in the core C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0,
implying that C(vmax) ⊆ C(v(t)) for all t ≥ 0. Furthermore, since C(v(t)) = ∩ni=1Xi(t),
it follows that C(vmax) ⊆ Xi(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0. Therefore, relation (19) holds
for all x ∈ C(vmax). Thus, by summing the relations in (19) over i ∈ N , we obtain for all
t ≥ 0 and x ∈ C(vmax),
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− x‖2 −
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2. (20)
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By the definition of wi(t) in (16), using the stochasticity of A(t) and the convexity of the
squared norm, we obtain
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− x‖2 =
n∑
i=1
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)− x
∥∥∥∥∥
2
≤
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
aij(t)
)
‖xj(t)− x‖2.
By the doubly stochasticity of A(t), we have
∑n
i=1 aij(t) = 1 for every j, implying∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t)− x‖2 ≤
∑n
i=1 ‖xi(t)− x‖2. By substituting this relation in (20), we arrive at
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− x‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t)− x‖2 −
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2. (21)
The preceding relation shows that the scalar sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t + 1) − x‖2} is non-
increasing for any given x ∈ C(vmax). Therefore, the sequence must be convergent since it
is nonnegative. Moreover, by summing the relations in (21) over t = 0, . . . , s and taking
the limit as s→∞, we obtain
∞∑
t=0
n∑
i=1
‖ei(t)‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
‖xi(0)− x‖2,
which implies that limt→∞ ei(t) = 0 for all i ∈ N .
In our next result, we will use the instantaneous average of players allocations, defined
as follows:
y(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj(t) for all t ≥ 0.
The result shows that the difference between the bargaining payoff vector xi(t) for any
player i and the average y(t) of these payoffs converges to 0 as time goes to infinity. The
proof essentially uses the line of analysis that has been employed in [17], where the sets
Xi(t) are static in time, i.e., Xi(t) = Xi for all t. In addition, we also use the rate result
for doubly stochastic matrices that has been established in [15].
Lemma 4 Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose that for the bargaining protocol (16)–
(18) we have
lim
t→∞
‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Then, for every player i ∈ N we have
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0.
Proof. For any t ≥ s ≥ 0, define matrices
Φ(t, s) = A(t)A(t− 1) · · ·A(s+ 1)A(s),
with Φ(t, t) = A(t). Using the matrices Φ(t, s) and the expression for xi(t) in (18), we
can relate the vectors xi(t) with the vectors xi(s) at a time s for 0 ≤ s ≤ t− 1, as follows:
xi(t) =
n∑
j=1
[Φ(t− 1, s)]ij xj(s) +
t−1∑
r=s+1
(
n∑
j=1
[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij ej(r − 1)
)
+ ei(t− 1). (22)
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Under the doubly stochasticity of the matrices A(t), using y(t) = 1
n
∑n
j=1 x
j(t) and rela-
tion (22), we obtain
y(t) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
xj(s) +
1
n
t∑
r=s+1
(
n∑
j=1
ej(r − 1)
)
for all t ≥ s ≥ 0. (23)
By our assumption, we have limt→∞ ‖ei(t)‖ = 0 for all i. Thus, for any  > 0, there is an
integer sˆ ≥ 0 such that ‖ei(t)‖ ≤  for all t ≥ sˆ and all i. Using relations (22) and (23)
with s = sˆ, we obtain for all i and t ≥ sˆ+ 1,
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ =
∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
)
xj(sˆ)
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
(
[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
)
ej(r − 1) +
(
ei(t− 1)− 1
n
n∑
j=1
ej(t− 1)
)∥∥∥∥∥
≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖
+
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣‖ej(r − 1)‖+ ‖ei(t− 1)‖+ 1
n
n∑
j=1
‖ej(t− 1)‖.
Since ‖ei(t)‖ ≤  for all t ≥ sˆ and all i, it follows that
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, sˆ)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ ‖xj(sˆ)‖+  t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣[Φ(t− 1, r)]ij − 1
n
∣∣∣ + 2.
Under Assumptions 3 and 4, the following result holds for the matrices Φ(t, s), as
shown in [14] (see there Corollary 1):∣∣∣∣[Φ(t, s)]ij − 1n
∣∣∣∣ ≤ (1− α4n2)d t−s+1Q e−2 for all t ≥ s ≥ 0.
Substituting the preceding estimate in the estimate for ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖, we obtain
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−sˆQ e−2 n∑
j=1
‖xj(sˆ)‖+ n
t−1∑
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−rQ e−2
+ 2.
Letting t→∞, we see that
lim sup
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤ n
∞∑
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−rQ e−2
+ 2.
Note that
∑∞
r=sˆ+1
(
1− α
4n2
)d t−rQ e−2 <∞, which by the arbitrary choice of  yields
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
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Now, we focus on
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t) − y(t)‖. Since wi(t) =
∑n
j=1 aij(t)x
j(t) and since A(t)
is stochastic, it follows
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij(t)‖xj(t)− y(t)‖.
Exchanging the order of the summations over, and then using the doubly stochasticity of
A(t), we have
n∑
i=1
‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ ≤
n∑
j=1
(
n∑
i=1
aij(t)
)
‖xj(t)− y(t)‖ =
n∑
j=1
‖xj(t)− y(t)‖.
Since limt→∞ ‖xj(t) − y(t)‖ = 0 for all j, it follows that
∑n
i=1 ‖wi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0, thus
implying ‖wi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for all i ∈ N .
Note that Lemma 4 captures the effects of the matrices A(t) that represent players’
neighbor-graphs. At the same time, Lemma 3 is basically a consequence of the projection
property only. So far, the polyhedrality of the sets Xi(t) has not been used at all. We now
put all pieces together, namely Lemma 2 that exploits the polyhedrality of the bounding
sets Xi(t), Lemma 3 and Lemma 4. This brings us to the following convergence result for
the robust game < N, vmax >.
Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1–4 hold. Also, assume that
Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1,
where i.o. stands for infinitely often. Then, the players allocations xi(t) generated by bar-
gaining protocol (16)–(18) converge with probability 1 to an allocation in the core C(vmax),
i.e., there is a random vector x˜ ∈ C(vmax) such that with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− x˜‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Proof. By Lemma 3, for each player i ∈ N , the sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t)−x‖2} is convergent
for every x ∈ C(vmax) and the errors ei(t) are diminishing, i.e., ‖ei(t)‖ → 0. Then, by
Lemma 4 we have ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for every i. Hence,
{‖y(t)− x‖} is convergent for every x ∈ C(vmax). (24)
We want to show that {y(t)} is convergent and that its limit is in the core C(vmax) with
probability 1. For this, we note that since xi(t+ 1) ∈ Xi(t), it holds
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) ≤
n∑
i=1
‖y(t+ 1)− xi(t+ 1)‖2 for all t ≥ 0.
The preceding relation and ‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for all i ∈ N (cf. Lemma 4) imply
lim
t→∞
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) = 0.
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Under Assumptions 1 and 2, by Lemma 2 we obtain
dist2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) ≤ µ
n∑
i=1
dist2 (y(t+ 1), Xi(t)) for all t ≥ 0.
By combining the preceding two relations we see that
lim
t→∞
dist2 (y(t+ 1), C(v(t))) = 0. (25)
By our assumption, the event {v(t) = vmax infinitely often} happens with probabil-
ity 1. We now fix a realization {vω(t)} of the sequence {v(t)} such that vω(t) = vmax holds
infinitely often (for infinitely many t’s). Let {tk} be a sequence such that
vω(tk) = v
max for all k.
All the variables corresponding to the realization {vω(t)} are denoted by a subscript ω. By
relation (24) the sequence {yω(t)} is bounded, therefore {yω(tk)} is bounded. Without loss
of generality (by passing to a subsequence of {tk} if necessary), we assume that {yω(tk)}
converges to some vector y˜ω, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
yω(tk) = y˜ω.
Thus, the preceding two relations and Eq. (25) imply that y˜ω ∈ C(vmax). Then, by
relation (24), we have that {‖yω(t)− y˜ω‖} is convergent, from which we conclude that y˜ω
must be the unique accumulation point of the sequence {yω(t)}, i.e.,
lim
t→∞
yω(t) = y˜ω, y˜ω ∈ C(vmax).
This and the assumption Prob {v(t) = vmax i.o.} = 1, imply that the sequence {y(t)}
converges with probability 1 to a random point y˜ ∈ C(vmax). Since by Lemma 4 we have
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ → 0 for every i, it follows that the sequences {xi(t)}, i = 1, . . . , n, converge
with probability 1 to a common random point in the core C(vmax).
4 Dynamic Average Game
When the core of the robust game is empty, the core of the instantaneous average game can
provide a meaningful solution under some conditions on the distribution of the functions
v(t). In what follows, we focus on the instantaneous average game associated with the dy-
namic TU game < N, {v(t)} >. In the next sections, we define the instantaneous average
game, we introduce a bargaining protocol for the game and investigate the convergence
properties of the bargaining protocol.
4.1 Average Game and Bargaining Protocol
Consider a dynamic TU game < N, {v(t)} > with each v(t) being a random characteristic
function. With the dynamic game we associate a dynamic average game < N, {v¯(t)} >,
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where v¯(t) is the average of the characteristic functions v(0), . . . , v(t), i.e.,
v¯(t) =
1
t+ 1
t∑
k=0
v(k) for all t ≥ 0.
An instantaneous average game at time t ≥ 0 is the game < N, v¯(t) >. We let C(v¯(t))
denote the core of the instantaneous average game at time t and let X¯i(t) denote the
bounding set of player i for the instantaneous game < N, v¯(t) >, i.e., for all i ∈ N and
t ≥ 0,
X¯i(t) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = v¯N(t), e′Sx ≥ v¯S(t) for all S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S} . (26)
Note that X¯i(0) = Xi(0) for all i ∈ N since v¯(0) = v(0). In what follows, we assume that
X¯i(t) are nonempty for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0.
In this setting, the bargaining process for the players is given by
xi(t+ 1) = PX¯i(t)
[
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t)
]
for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0, (27)
where aij(t) ≥ 0 is a scalar weight that player i assigns to the proposed allocation xj(t)
received from player j at time t. The initial allocations xi(0), i ∈ N , are selected randomly
and independently of {v(t)}. Regarding the weights aij(t), recall that these weights are
reflective of the players’ neighbor-graph: aij(t) = 0 for all j 6∈ Ni(t), where Ni(t) is the
set of neighbors of player i (including himself) at time t, while we may have aij(t) ≥ 0
only for j ∈ Ni(t).
4.2 Assumptions and Preliminaries
In this section, we provide our assumptions for the average game, and discuss some aux-
iliary results that we need later on in the convergence analysis of the bargaining protocol.
Regarding the random characteristic functions v(t) we use the following assumption.
Assumption 5 The sequence {v(t)} is ergodic, i.e., with probability 1, we have
lim
t→∞
v¯(t) = vmean with vmean ∈ Rm.
Furthermore, vN(t) = v
mean for all t with probability 1.
Assumption 5 basically says that the grand coalition value vN(t) is constant with proba-
bility 1. Note that Assumption 5 is satisfied, for example, when {vS(t)} is an independent
identically distributed sequence with a finite expectation E[vS(t)] for all S ⊂ N .
We refer to the TU game < N, vmean > as average game, which is well defined under
Assumption 5. We let C(vmean) be the core of the average game and X¯i be the bounding
set for player i in the game, i.e.,
C(vmean) = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN , e′Sx ≥ vmeanS for all nonempty S ⊂ N} ,
18
X¯i = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN , e′Sx ≥ vmeanS for all S ⊂ N such that i ∈ S} . (28)
Note that the average core C(vmean) lies in the hyperplane H = {x ∈ Rn | e′Nx = vmeanN }.
Hence, the dimension of the core is at most n − 1. We will in fact assume that the
dimension of the average core C(vmean) is n− 1, by requiring the existence of a point z in
the core such that all other inequalities defining the core are satisfied as strict inequalities.
Specifically, we make use of the following assumption.
Assumption 6 There exists a vector zˆ ∈ C(vmean) such that
e′S zˆ > v
mean
S for all nonempty S ⊂ N.
Assumption 6 basically says that zˆ is in the relative interior of the core C(vmean) of the
average game and that the core C(vmean) has dimension n − 1. This assumption will be
important in establishing the convergence of the bargaining protocol (27). In particular,
the following result will be important, which is an immediate consequence of Assumption 6
and the polyhedrality of the cores C(v¯(t)).
Lemma 5 Let Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Then, with probability 1, for every z in relative
interior of C(vmean) there exists tz large enough such that z is in the relative interior of
C(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz with probability 1.
Proof. Let z be in the relative interior of C(vmean) which exists by Assumption 6. Thus,
e′Nz = v
mean
N and e
′
Sz > v
mean
S for all S ⊂ N . By Assumption 5, with probability 1 we
have v¯N(t) = v
mean
N and v¯S(t) → vmeanS for S ⊂ N . Hence, v¯N(t)′z = (vmeanN )′z for all t
with probability 1. Furthermore, there exists a random time tz large enough so that with
probability 1,
e′Sz > v¯S(t) for all S ⊂ N and all t ≥ tz,
implying that z is in the relative interior of C(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz with probability 1.
Lemma 5 shows that the sets C(v¯(t)) and C(vmean) have the same dimension for large
enough t with probability 1. In particular, this lemma implies that the cores C(v¯(t)) are
nonempty with probability 1 for all t sufficiently large.
Aside from Lemma 5, in our convergence analysis of the bargaining protocol, we make
use of two additional well-known results. One of them is the super-martingale convergence
theorem due to Robbins and Siegmund [21] (it can also be found in [18], Chapter 2.2,
Lemma 11).
Theorem 2 Let {Vk}, {gk}, and {hk} be non-negative random scalar sequences. Let Fk
be the σ-algebra generated by V1, . . . , Vk, g1, . . . gk, h1, . . . hk. Suppose that almost surely,
E[Vk+1 | Fk] ≤ Vk − gk + hk for all k,
and
∑
k hk < ∞ almost surely. Then, almost surely both the sequence {Vk} converges to
a non-negative random variable and
∑
k gk <∞.
The other well-known result that we use is pertinent to two nonempty polyhedral sets
whose description differs only in the right-hand side vector. The result can be found in [7],
3.2.5 Corollary, pages 258–259.
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Lemma 6 Let Pb and Pb˜ be two polyhedral sets given by
Pb = {x ∈ Rn | Bx ≤ b}, Pb˜ = {x ∈ Rn | Bx ≤ b˜},
where B is an m × n matrix and b, b˜ ∈ Rm. Then, there is a scalar L > 0 such that for
every b, b˜ ∈ Rm for which Pb 6= ∅ and Pb˜ 6= ∅, we have
dist(x, Pb˜) ≤ L‖b− b˜‖ for any x ∈ Pb,
where the constant L depends on the matrix B.
For two polyhedral sets Pb and Pb˜ as in Lemma 6 we also have
dist(x, Pb) ≤ dist(x, Pb˜) + L‖b− b˜‖ for any x ∈ Rn (29)
(see Rockafellar [22], 4.34 Lemma on page 132).
4.3 Convergence to Core of Average Game
Here, we show the convergence of the bargaining protocol to the core of the average
game. In our analysis, we find it convenient to re-write the bargaining protocol (27) in
an equivalent form by separating a linear and a non-linear term. The linear term is the
vector w¯i(t) given by
w¯i(t) =
n∑
j=1
aij(t)x
j(t) for all i ∈ N and t. (30)
The non-linear term is expressed by the error
e¯i(t) = PX¯i(t)[w¯
i(t)]− w¯i(t). (31)
Now, using relations (30) and (31), we can rewrite (27) as follows:
xi(t+ 1) = w¯i(t) + e¯i(t) for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0. (32)
We first show some basic properties of the players’ allocations by using the preceding
equivalent description of the bargaining protocol (27). These properties hold under the
doubly stochasticity of the weights aij(t) that comprise the matrix A(t).
Lemma 7 Let Assumptions 5 and 6 hold. Also, let the matrices A(t) be doubly stochastic.
Then, for bargaining protocol (30)–(32), we have with probability 1:
(a) The sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t + 1)− z‖2} converges for every z in the relative interior
of C(vmean).
(b) The errors e¯i(t) in (17) are such that
∑∞
t=0
∑n
j=1 ‖e¯i(t)‖2 < ∞. In particular,
limt→∞ ‖e¯i(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N .
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Proof. Let rintY denote the relative interior of a set Y . Let z ∈ rintC(vmean) be arbitrary
and fixed for the rest of the proof. By Lemma 5, there exists tz large enough such that
z ∈ rintC(v¯(t)) for all t ≥ tz with probability 1. Since C(v¯(t)) = ∩ni=1Xi(t), it follows
that z ∈ X¯i(t) for all i ∈ N and t ≥ tz with probability 1.
From xi(t+1) = w¯i(t)+e¯i(t) (cf. (32)), the definition of e¯i(t) in (31), and the projection
property given in Eq. (8), we have with probability 1, for i ∈ N and all t ≥ tz,
‖xi(t+ 1)− z‖2 ≤ ‖w¯i(t)− z‖2 − ‖e¯i(t)‖2.
Summing these relations over i ∈ N , and using w¯i(t) = ∑nj=1 aijxi(t), the convexity of
the norm and the stochasticity of A(t), we obtain
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− z‖2 ≤
n∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
aij(t)‖xj(t)− z‖2 −
n∑
j=1
‖e¯i(t)‖2.
Exchanging the order of summation in
∑n
i=1
∑n
j=1 aij(t)‖xj(t)−z‖2 and using the doubly
stochasticity of A(t), we have for all t ≥ tz with probability 1,
n∑
i=1
‖xi(t+ 1)− z‖2 ≤
n∑
j=1
‖xj(t)− z‖2 −
n∑
j=1
‖e¯i(t)‖2.
Applying the super-martingale converge theorem (Theorem 2) (with an index shift), we
see that the sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t+ 1)− z‖2} is convergent and ∑∞t=tz∑nj=1 ‖e¯i(t)‖2 <∞
with probability 1. Hence, the result in part (b) follows.
We observe that Lemma 4 applies to protocol (30)–(32) in view of the analogy of the
description of the protocol in (16)–(18) and the protocol in (30)–(32). We will re-state
this lemma for an easier reference, but without the proof since it is almost the same as
that of Lemma 4 (the proof in essence depends mainly on the matrices A(k)).
Lemma 8 Let Assumptions 3 and 4 hold. Suppose that for the bargaining protocol (30)–
(32) we have with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
‖e¯i(t)‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
Then, for every player i ∈ N we have with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0, lim
t→∞
‖w¯i(t)− y(t)‖ = 0,
where y(t) = 1
n
∑n
j=1 x
j(t).
We are now ready to show the convergence of the bargaining protocol. We show this
in the following theorem by combining the basic properties of the protocol established in
Lemma 7 and using Lemma 8.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 3–6 hold. Then, the bargaining protocol (30)–(32) con-
verges to a random allocation that lies in the core C(vmean) of the average game with
probability 1, i.e., there is a random vector z˜ ∈ C(vmean) such that with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− z˜‖ = 0 for all i ∈ N.
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Proof. By Lemma 7, with probability 1, the sequence {∑ni=1 ‖xi(t)− z‖2} is convergent
for every z in the relative interior of C(vmean) and ‖ei(t)‖ → 0 for each player i ∈ N . By
Lemma 8, with probability 1 we have
lim
t→∞
‖xi(t)− y(t)‖ = 0 for every i ∈ N. (33)
Hence, with probability 1,
{‖y(t)− z‖} is convergent for every z ∈ rintC(vmean). (34)
We next show that {y(t)} has accumulation points in the core C(vmean) with proba-
bility 1. Since xi(t+ 1) ∈ X¯i(t), it follows
n∑
i=1
dist2
(
y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)
) ≤ n∑
i=1
‖y(t+ 1)− xi(t+ 1)‖2. (35)
Relations (35) and (33) imply
lim
t→∞
n∑
i=1
dist2
(
y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)
)
= 0 with probability 1. (36)
Let i ∈ N be arbitrary but fixed and let x ∈ X¯i be arbitrary. Note that we can write
‖y(t+ 1)− x‖ ≤ ‖y(t+ 1)− PX¯i(t)[y(t+ 1)]‖+ ‖PX¯i(t)[y(t+ 1)]− x‖.
By taking the minimum over x ∈ X¯i and using ‖y(t + 1)− PX¯i(t)[y(t + 1)]‖ = dist(y(t +
1), X¯i(t)), we obtain for all i ∈ N and t ≥ 0,
dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i) ≤ dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)) + dist
(
PX¯i(t)[y(t+ 1)], X¯i
)
.
The bounding sets X¯i are nonempty by Assumption 6 and the fact C(v
mean) ⊂ X¯i for all i,
while X¯i(t) are assumed nonempty (see the discussion after relation (26)). Furthermore,
since X¯i and X¯i(t) are polyhedral sets, by Lemma 6 it follows that for a scalar Li > 0
and all t ≥ 0,
dist
(
PX¯i(t)[y(t+ 1)], X¯i
) ≤ Li‖v¯(t)− vmean‖.
Therefore, for all i ∈ N and all t ≥ 0,
dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i) ≤ dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i(t)) + Li‖v¯(t)− vmean‖.
By letting t→∞ and using relations (36) and v¯(t)→ vmean (Assumption 5), we see that
for all i ∈ N with probability 1,
lim
t→∞
dist(y(t+ 1), X¯i) = 0. (37)
In view of relation (34), the sequence {y(t)} is bounded with probability 1, so it
has accumulation points with probability 1. By relation (37), all accumulation points of
{y(t+1)} lie in the set X¯i for every i ∈ N with probability 1. Therefore, the accumulation
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points of {y(t)} must lie in the intersection ∩i∈NX¯i with probability 1. Since ∩i∈NX¯i =
C(vmean), we conclude that all accumulation points of {y(t)} lie in the core C(vmean) with
probability 1. Furthermore, according to relation (34) we have that, for any point z ∈
rintC(vmean), the accumulation points of the sequences {y(t)} are at the same (random)
distance from z with probability 1. Since the accumulation points are in the set C(vmean),
it follows that {y(k)} is convergent with probability 1 and its limit point is in the core
C(vmean) with probability 1. Now, since ‖xi(t) − y(t)‖ → 0 with probability 1 for all i
(see (33)), the sequences {xi(t)}, i ∈ N , have the same limit point as the sequence {y(t)}.
Thus, the sequences {xi(t)}, i ∈ N , converge to a common (random) point in C(vmean)
with probability 1.
Theorem 3 shows the convergence of the allocations generated by the bargaining pro-
tocol in (30)–(32). The convergence relies on the properties of the matrices and the
connectivity of the players’ neighbor graphs, as reflected in Assumptions 3 and 4. It also
critically depends on the fact that the core of the average game C(vmean) has dimension
n−1 and that all bounding sets X¯i(t) and, hence the cores C(v¯(t)), lie in the same hyper-
plane with probability 1, the hyperplane defined through the constant value of the grand
coalition.
5 Numerical Illustrations
In this section, we report some numerical simulations. We consider coalitional TU games
with 3 players, so the number of possible nonempty coalitions is m = 7. We consider
two different scenarios as shown respectively in rows I and II in Table 2. The columns of
Table 2 enumerate the coalitions. In each scenario, the characteristic functions vS(t) are
generated independently with identical uniform distribution over an interval. Specifically,
we suppose that the values of single player coalitions {1} and {2} are uncertain within
the given interval. All the other coalitions’ values are fixed and equal to zero except for
the grand coalition, which has value 10 in both scenarios I and II.
The two scenarios differ in that the core C(vmax) of the robust game is nonempty in
scenario I and empty in scenario II. For scenario I, we simulate the convergence behavior
of the bargaining protocol (16)–(18) for the robust game, while for scenario II, we simulate
bargaining protocol (30)–(32) for the average game.
For each scenario, we run 50 different Monte Carlo trajectories each one having 100
iterations. The number of iterations is chosen long enough to show the convergence of the
protocols. All plots include the sampled average and sampled variance for the 50 different
trajectories that were simulated. Each trajectory in each scenario is generated by starting
with the same initial allocations, which are given by x1(0) = [10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′,
and x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. The sampled average is computed for each time t = 1, . . . , 100, by
fixing the time t and computing the average value of the 50 trajectory sample values for
v{1} v{2} v{3} v{1,2} v{1,3} v{2,3} v{1,2,3}
I [4, 7] [0, 3] 0 0 0 0 10
II [4, 9] [0, 5] 0 0 0 0 10
Table 2: Coalitions’ values for the two simulations scenarios.
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that time. The sampled variance is computed as the variance of the samples with respect
to their sampled average.
Regarding the players’ neighbor-graphs, we assume that the graphs are deterministic
but time-varying. The graphs for the times t = 0, 1, 2 are as follows: player 2 and
3 connected at time t = 0 (see Figure 5(a)), then player 3 and 1 connected at time
t = 1 (Figure 5(b)), and finally player 1 and 2 connected at time t = 3 (Figure 5(c)).
These graphs are then repeated consecutively in the same order. In this way, the players’
neighbor-graph is connected every 3 time units (Assumption 4 is satisfied with Q = 2).
The matrices that we associate with these three graphs, are respectively given by:
A(0) =
 1 0 00 1
2
1
2
0 1
2
1
2
 , A(1) =
 12 0 120 1 0
1
2
0 1
2
 , A(2) =
 12 12 01
2
1
2
0
0 0 1
 .
These matrices are also repeated in the same order for the rest of the time. Thus, at any
time t, the matrix A(t) is doubly stochastic, with positive diagonal, and every positive
entry bounded below by 1
2
, so Assumption 3 is satisfied with α = 1
2
. All simulations are
carried out with MATLAB on an Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo, CPU P8400 at 2.27 GHz and
a 3GB of RAM. The run time of each simulation is around 90 seconds.
5.1 Simulation Scenario I
In this scenario, the coalitions’ values are generated as given in row I of Table 2. In
particular, at each time t, the value v{1}(t) is chosen randomly in the interval [4, 7] with
uniform probability independently of the other times. Similarly, the values v{2}(t) are
generated in the interval [0, 3]. The grand coalition value is fixed to 10 at all times, and
the other coalition values are 0. With this data, we consider the allocations as generated
by players i = 1, 2, 3 according to the bargaining protocol in (16)–(18) for the robust game
as reported in Subsection 5.1.1. We then consider the bargaining protocol in (30)–(32)
for the average game in Subsection 5.1.2.
5.1.1 Robust game
For this specific example, the characteristic function vmax for the robust game is obtained
by considering the highest possible coalition values (see the data in row I of Table 2),
which results in vmax = [7 3 0 0 0 0 10]′. The resulting core of the robust game is given by
C(vmax) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 7, x2 ≥ 3, x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
v1
v2 v3
(a)
v1
v2 v3
(b)
v1
v2 v3
(c)
Figure 5: Topology of players’ neighbor-graph at three distinct times t = 0, 1 and 2.
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We note that this core contains a single point, namely [7 3 0]′.
To ensure that v(t) = vmax infinitely often, as required by Theorem 1 for the conver-
gence of the protocol, we adopt the following randomization mechanism. At each time
t = 1, . . . , 100, we flip a coin and if the outcome is “head” (probability 1/2), the coalitions’
values v{1}(t) and v{2}(t) are extracted from the intervals [4, 7] and [0, 3], respectively, with
uniform probability independently of the other times. If the outcome of the coin flip is
“tail”, then we assume that the robust game realizes and take v(t) = vmax.
We next present the results obtained by the Monte Carlo runs for the bargaining
protocol in (16)–(18). An illustration of a typical run with the allocations generated in
periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3 is shown below:
v(0) = [6.8 2.7 . . . 10]′
v(1) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
v(2) = [4.4 1.1 . . . 10]′
v(3) = [7 3 . . . 10]′
x1(0) = [10 0 0]′
x1(1) = [10 0 0]′
x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′
x2(0) = [0 10 0]′
x2(1) = [0 5 5]′
x2(2) = [0 5 5]′
x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′
x3(1) = [0 5 5]′
x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x3(3) = [5 2.5 2.5]′.
Recall that the initial allocations of the players are x1(0) = [10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′,
and x3(0) = [0 0 10]′. At time t = 1, bargaining involves player 2 and 3 who update
the allocations respectively as x2(1) = [0 5 5]′ and x3(1) = [0 5 5]′. These allocations
are feasible for their bounding sets so the projections on these sets are not performed.
At time t = 2, the bargaining involves player 1 and 3 who update their allocations,
respectively, as x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′ and x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′. Again, these allocations
are feasible for their bounding sets and the projections are not performed. Finally, at
time t = 3, the bargaining involves player 1 and 2 who update their allocations resulting
in x1(3) = [7 1.5 1.5]′ and x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′. Notice that x1(3) is obtained after
player 1 projects onto his bounding set.
In Figures 6 and 7, we report our simulation results for the average of the sample tra-
jectories obtained by Monte Carlo runs. Figure 6 shows the sampled average and variance
of the allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 per iteration t. In accordance with the convergence
result of Theorem 1, the sampled averages of the players’ allocations xi(t) converge to the
same point, namely x = [7 3 0]′ which is in the core of the robust game C(vmax). Figure 7
shows that the sample average and sampled variance of the errors ei(t) converge to 0, as
expected in view of Lemma 3(b).
5.1.2 Average game
In this numerical example, for scenario I data as given in row I of Table 2, we consider the
average TU game and its corresponding bargaining protocol (30)–(32). We at first provide
a sample example and report the outcomes for the first three steps of the algorithm, as
reported below:
v¯(0) = [5.5 1.6 . . . 10]′
v¯(1) = [4.8 1.8 . . . 10]′
v¯(2) = [4.6 1.8 . . . 10]′
v¯(3) = [4.7 1.8 . . . 10]′
x1(0) = [10 0 0]′
x1(1) = [10 0 0]′
x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x1(3) = [4.7 2.6 2.7]′
x2(0) = [0 10 0]′
x2(1) = [0 5 5]′
x2(2) = [0 5 5]′
x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′
x3(1) = [0 5 5]′
x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′
x3(3) = [5 2.5 2.5]′.
Recalling that the initial players’ allocations are x1(0) = [10 0 0]′, x2(0) = [0 10 0]′, and
x3(0) = [0 0 10]′, we note that at time t = 1, bargaining involves player 2 and 3 who
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Figure 6: Plots of the sampled average (left) and variance (right) of players’ allocations
xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 generated by bargaining protocol (16)–(18) for the robust game associated
with the data in row I of Table 2. Sampled averages of the allocations xi(t) converge to
the same point x˜ = [7 3 0]′ ∈ C(vmax), while sampled variances go rapidly to zero.
Figure 7: Plots of the sampled average (left) and sampled variance (right) of the errors
ei(t), i = 1, 2, 3 for the bargaining protocol (16)–(18) and the robust game associated
with the data in row I of Table 2. Sampled averages and the variances of the errors ei(t)
converge to zero.
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Figure 8: Plots of the sampled averages (left) and variances (right) of players’ allocations
xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3, obtained by bargaining protocol (30)–(32) for the average game associated
with the data in row I of Table 2. Sampled averages converge to point x˜ = [5.6 2.2 2.2]′ ∈
C(vmean), which is the average of the limit points of the 50-sample trajectories.
update their allocations to x2(1) = [0 5 5]′ and x3(1) = [0 5 5]′, respectively. At time
t = 2, the bargaining involves player 1 and 3 who update their allocations, respectively,
to x1(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′ and x3(2) = [5 2.5 2.5]′. Notice that the obtained allocations
for t = 1, 2 are feasible for the bounding sets and, therefore, no projection is performed.
Finally, at time t = 3, the bargaining involves player 1 and 2 who update their allocations
to x1(3) = [4.7 2.6 2.7]′ and x2(3) = [2.5 3.75 3.75]′, respectively. Here x1(3) results from
projecting onto the bounding set of player 1.
For the average game associated with the data in row I of Table 2, we have vmean =
[5.5 1.5 0 0 0 0 10]′ and the core C(vmean) given by
C(vmean) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 5.5, x2 ≥ 1.5, x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
In Figures 8 and 9, we depict our simulation results generated by bargaining pro-
tocol (30)–(32) for the average game. Figure 8 shows that the sampled average of the
allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 converge to a common point x˜ = [5.6 2.2 2.2]′ which belongs
to the core C(vmean) of the average game, as guaranteed by Theorem 3. The sampled
variance does not converge to zero as the common limit point of the allocations xi(t)
can be different for different runs. Figure 9 demonstrates that the sampled average and
variance of the errors e¯i(t), i = 1, 2, 3, converge to zero, as predicted by Lemma 7(b).
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Figure 9: Plots of the sampled average (left) and variance (right) of the errors e¯i(t),
i = 1, 2, 3, for bargaining protocol (30)–(32) and the average game associated with the
data in row I of Table 2. The sampled average and variance of the errors e¯i(t) goes to 0.
5.2 Simulation Scenario II
Here, we report the simulation results obtained by the bargaining protocol (30)–(32) for
the average game corresponding to the data in row II of Table 2. In this case the core of
the robust game is empty, so we do not consider the robust game. The average game has
characteristic function vmean = [6.5 2.5 0 0 0 0 10]′ and its core is
C(vmean) = {x ∈ R3 : x1 ≥ 6.5, x2 ≥ 2.5, x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x3 ≥ 0,
x2 + x3 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 + x3 = 10}.
Figures 10 and 11 show the results for the average game obtained in our simulations. In
Figure 10, we report the sampled averages of the players’ allocations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3,
obtained by bargaining protocol (30)–(32). In accordance with Theorem 3, the players’
allocations converge to an allocation that lies in the core of the average game C(vmean),
precisely to the point x˜ = [6.6 2.6 0.8]′ ∈ C(vmean). Here, again, the sampled variance
of the allocations does not converge to zero as their common limit point is different for
different runs. Figure 11 shows that the sampled average and variance of the errors e¯i(t),
i = 1, 2, 3, converge to zero.
6 Conclusions
This article deals with dynamics and robustness within the framework of coalitional TU
games. With respect to a sequence of TU games, each with a random characteristic
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Figure 10: Plots of the sampled averages (left) and variances (right) of the players’ al-
locations xi(t), i = 1, 2, 3 obtained by the bargaining protocol (30)–(32) for the average
game associated with the data in row II of Table 2. Sampled averages converge to point
x˜ = [6.6 2.6 0.8]′ ∈ C(vmean), which is the average of the limit points of the 50-sample
trajectories.
function, the novelty of the work lies in the design of a decentralized allocation process
defined over a communication graph of players. The allocation process captures the main
features of bargaining in a realistic scenario. The proposed bargaining scheme is proven
to converge, with probability 1, in either a robust game setting or an average game
setting, under mild assumptions on the communication topology among the players and
the stochastic properties of the random characteristic function. The key properties that
distinguish this work from the existing work on dynamic games are: (1) the introduction
of a time-varying communication graph, termed players’ neighbor-graph, over which the
bargaining protocol takes place; and (2) the distributed bargaining protocol for players’
allocations updates subject to local information exchange with neighboring players.
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